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Abstract. Today, cyber threats have the potential to harm critical infrastructures which may
result in the interruption of life-sustaining services, catastrophic economic damages or severe
degradation of national security. The diversity and complexity of cyber threats that exploit the
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures increase every day. . In order to lessen the potential harm
of cyber threats, countermeasures have to be applied and the effectiveness of these
countermeasures has to be monitored continuously. In this study, a brief definition and history of
critical infrastructures are introduced. Cyber threats are examined in four fundamental
categories. Vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures are categorized and examined. Finally,
countermeasures that may play a key role in critical infrastructure protection programs are
categorized.
1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum
operations of the economy and the government.1 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is an
important program in which governments have to take action in order to cope with cyber threats.
The first formal document that uses the term "critical infrastructure" dates back to 15 July 1996,
which is an executive order signed by the U.S. president.2 Physical threats and 'cyber threats' are
stated as two major threat types in this executive order. The purpose of the executive order is to
set forth the basic steps of CIP.
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According to the Presidential Decision Directive, many of the critical infrastructures have
historically been physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. As a
result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however,
these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked.3 Therefore, it is
important to note that the term of “critical infrastructure protection” was proposed after the
widespread use of information technologies in these infrastructures. Critical infrastructures and
information technologies have strong relationships in many different ways and levels.4
Cyber threats are evolving with each passing day. Almost every week, a new cyber incident
appears in the media. Cyber threats are asymmetric in nature.5 They can harm critical
infrastructures in great extent by making minor cyber operations. In this paper, cyber threats
against critical infrastructures are tried to be categorized. The vulnerabilities of critical
infrastructures are defined. The countermeasures for the resulting risks are categorized and listed.
2. Strategies to Counter Cyber Attacks
In this part of the paper, cyber assets, cyber threats, vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures and
countermeasures are explained in the following four subsections respectively.
2.1 Cyber Assets: Critical Infrastructures
Today, almost all critical sectors use cyber systems. Transportation, banking and finance, health
and emergency, defense sectors and vital government facilities use conventional information
technologies. Telecommunications sector is also a critical infrastructure and it is entirely
composed of information technologies.6 Some of the critical sectors are controlled and monitored
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by SCADA systems, which are specially crafted software and equipment. SCADA stands for
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. Energy, water and critical manufacturing are key
sectors that use SCADA systems.
In the 70s, 80s and even in the 90s, SCADA systems were legacy systems. They composed of
exotic, proprietary and even obscure hardware and software. The SCADA systems were almost
unique to the specific infrastructure. SCADA systems were isolated as well. There were no
access to corporate networks and the Internet. In those days, there was no Internet in fact.
Today, SCADA systems use open international standards for most of the operations. They use
standard hardware, software, operating systems, and protocols. SCADA systems make use of
COTS (Commercial off the shelf) products in most cases. Today, SCADA systems are well
documented as well. Finally, SCADA systems are connected to corporate networks and even to
the Internet by wired or wireless means.7 Therefore, energy and water industries may be exposed
to cyber threats directly.
In general, almost all of the critical sectors are connected to the Internet. Although Internet is a
physically distributed infrastructure, it is logically unified. In this unique logical infrastructure,
we live with cyber threats like cyber attacks, cyber criminals and cyber spies. In the next
subsection, cyber threats are elucidated in four categories.
2.2 Cyber Threats
Cyber threats can be categorized in four main groups.8 These groups are hacktivism, cyber
crime, cyber espionage and cyber war. However there is no clear-cut distinction among these
groups as shown in Figure-1. These categorized cyber threats can intersect with each other in
many different ways. A member of a hacktivist group may get into a cyber crime activity. The
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same guy may take part in coordinated cyber war or cyber espionage.
A cyber act can be categorized or perceived as both cyber war and hacktivism. As an example, a
country can consider a cyber incident as cyber war. On the contrary, another country can
consider the same act as hacktivism.

Figure 1: Four types of cyber threats

When critical infrastructures are taken into consideration, cyber espionage and cyber war are
much more harmful than hacktivism and cyber crime.
2.2.1 Hacktivism
Hacktivists create opportunistic attacks against weak targets. The power of hacktivists comes
from their number. Hacktivism is the activity of a group of hackers. The hacker group
'Anonymous' is a hacktivist group. The main purpose of hacktivists is not to make money.
Rather, they protest something. For example, they protest the governmental restrictions to the
Internet and they take aim at the websites of public organizations.
Hacktivists usually perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. A DoS attack can be defined as
purposefully flooding the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system with a huge number of

legitimate service requests. Hacktivists usually target the availability of networks and systems by
performing DoS attacks. In addition to DoS attacks, hacktivists try to deface websites, especially
websites of public organizations. They do not usually try to deface a specific website for a long
time. Rather, they search for a specific vulnerability on a number of websites and deface all of
the websites in their search scope that contain the specific vulnerability. Hacktivist use botnets or
get contact with the owner of botnets in order to perform Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks to
guarantee the unavailability of networks and systems.
2.2.2 Cyber Crime
By contrast with hacktivists, the main purpose of cyber criminals is to make money. Cyber
criminals are individuals. Usually, they do not act in groups like hacktivists. They steal credit
card information, bank account credentials and passwords. The target critical sector for cyber
criminals is banking and finance. Compared to the other threat types, cyber crime does not have
a prominent effect on critical infrastructures.
2.2.3 Cyber Espionage
Cyber espionage is basically the act of stealing documents from networks of foreign countries 9.
The loss of confidentiality is the major consequence of cyber espionage. The term Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) is used under the context of cyber espionage. According to the
Mandiant, which is a famous information security company, APT is a group of sophisticated,
determined and coordinated attackers that have been systematically compromising (U.S.)
government and commercial computer networks for years. The vast majority of APT activity
observed by Mandiant has been linked to China.10
According to the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, every year, an
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amount of intellectual property larger than that contained in the Library of Congress is stolen
from networks maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and government departments and
agencies. 11
US - China Economic and Security Review Commission of USA prepared a report to Congress
in 2008. According to this report, China has an active cyber espionage program. This report says
that China’s cyber warfare is so sophisticated that the United States may be unable to counteract
or even detect the efforts.12
2.2.4 Cyber War
Cyber war is the coordinated attacks to specific critical sectors of a country. Every critical sector
is a potential target of cyber war. Most of the cyber security experts think that Stuxnet virus is
the beginning of real cyber war. Stuxnet was discovered in June 2010. The target of the Stuxnet
virus was the availability of Iranian nuclear energy infrastructure. According to a New York
Times report, which was released on 1 January 2012, President Obama secretly ordered
increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear
enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of cyber weapons,
according to participants in the program.13 The cyber attacks against the availability of Estonian
and Georgian websites and network infrastructures are another example of cyber war. Although
Russia did not undertake those attacks as a government, the coordinated attacks were performed
by Russian people. The target of cyber war is not only the availability of systems and networks.
A virus called 'duqu' affected the confidentiality of Iranian energy infrastructure. Duqu was
discovered after Stuxnet. It is considered that the source of duqu and Stuxnet was the same
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because of their similarities. Duqu provided services to the attackers; currently this includes
information stealing capabilities.14 The last discovered malware is called Flame, Flamer or
Skywiper. According to the New York Times, Flame appears to be part of the state-sponsored
campaign that spied on and eventually set back Iran’s nuclear program in 2010.15
2.2.5 Cyber Threats - Final Remarks
The number of cyber espionage and cyber war activities is low compared to the number of cyber
crime and hacktivist attacks. When the economic damage and national security is the main
concern, the impact level of cyber espionage is very high compared to the impact level of other
threats types.16 Although cyber espionage attacks are low in number, they cause intellectual
property losses. This has a great value for a country. Although cyber crime activities are large in
number, the loss is limited to credentials and money. When the public safety is the main concern,
the impact level of cyber war is high compared to the impact level of other threat types. Cyber
war can affect the availability of SCADA systems and corporate networks.
According to the draft Cyber Security Act of 2012, an industry can be defined as “critical” if
damage or unauthorized access to that system could reasonably
a) Result in the interruption of life-sustaining services,
b) Cause catastrophic economic damages or
c) Cause severe degradation of national security. 17
By using this damage classification, the prominent effects of the four threat categories on critical
infrastructures are shown in Table-1. Although there is no crystal-clear classification and
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correlation between threat types and impact types, Table-1 shares the notion that cyber espionage
and cyber war are much more harmful than cyber crime and hacktivism.
THREAT TYPE

IMPACT TYPE

Hacktivism

The interruption of life-sustaining services (Minor)

Cyber Crime

Economic damages (Minor)

Cyber Espionage

Economic damages (Major)
Severe degradation of national security

Cyber War

The interruption of life-sustaining services (Major)
Economic damages (Intermediate)
Table 1: Threat categories versus impacts

2.3 Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures can be classified into two major groups, which are
technical vulnerabilities and non-technical vulnerabilities.
2.3.1 Technical Vulnerabilities
Technical vulnerabilities are divided into two subgroups; which are basic protocol vulnerabilities
and application vulnerabilities. Basic protocol vulnerabilities are the vulnerabilities of common
Internet protocols.18 The core protocols of the Internet such as Internet Protocol (IP),
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Domain Name System (DNS), Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) and routing protocols were designed and implemented without focusing on
security features since the Internet was initially used in academic and governmental
environments. At these environments, humans were trusted entities. Security countermeasures
are included in Internet protocols as add-ons after the proliferation and widespread use of the
18

Alcaraz-Tello, "Secure Management of SCADA Networks" p. 23.

Internet. Therefore, the Internet is vulnerable to basic and competent attacks like denial of
service, eavesdropping, spoofing and sniffing. Apart from basic protocols, there are a number of
applications including operating systems that logically run on top of basic protocols. According
to the IBM X-force report, there is exponential increase in cumulative vulnerability disclosures
from 1996 to 2010.19 These application vulnerabilities are exploited by attackers to gain access
privileges to remote systems, to steal information and to stop services.
2.3.2 Non-technical Vulnerabilities
In spite of the state-of-the-art security systems, such as digital signatures, cryptography,
biometric security, stateful firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, access control systems, the
number of security breaches increases. Even closed networks are infected with targeted worms
and viruses as in the case of Stuxnet. It is argued by security experts that Stuxnet infected the
closed energy network of Iran by means of USB thumb drives of the workers of the nuclear
enrichment facilities. The reason for security breaches is non-technical vulnerabilities. Nontechnical vulnerabilities are related with the people and the processes.20 Unfortunately, the
weakest link for security is the human being. As an example, in November 2008, US-CERT
issued a warning that malicious code was increasingly propagating via USB flash drive devices.
The fact that USB thumb drives are being used by so many people makes them an attractive
target for malware writers.21 In those days, US Department of Defense has temporarily banned
the use of thumb drives, CDs and other removable storage.22 Although, technical
countermeasures are vital for the security of critical infrastructures, it will not be as effective as
expected without improvements in the behavior of people and security processes.
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2.3.3 Vulnerabilities - Final Remarks
Certain threat types exploit certain vulnerabilities as shown in Table-2. Although it is not a
golden rule, hacktivists generally exploit basic protocols at first, and then application
vulnerabilities. Cyber criminals usually exploit application vulnerabilities. Cyber warriors use
application and infrastructure vulnerabilities like hacktivists. Finally, cyber spies exploit people
and process vulnerabilities.
THREAT TYPE

EXPLOITED VULNERABILITY TYPE

Hacktivism

Basic Protocol Vulnerabilities
Application Vulnerabilities

Cyber Crime

Application Vulnerabilities

Cyber Espionage

Non-technical Vulnerabilities
Application Vulnerabilities

Cyber War

Application Vulnerabilities
Basic Protocol Vulnerabilities
Table 2: Threat categories versus vulnerabilities

2.4 Countermeasures
Most of the vulnerabilities can be patched by using simple technical preventive countermeasures.
There will still be a considerable amount of risk after applying preventive countermeasures.
Corrective countermeasures should be used in order to minimize the risk amount. Even if all of
the preventive and corrective countermeasures are applied, there will be some minor residual
risk. Hundred percent security is not possible in the real world. There is no technology and
budget that eliminates the risk totally. The residual risks generally originate from the
vulnerabilities of people and processes. The cyber espionage teams and spies usually use these
vulnerabilities in order to steal information.

Countermeasures can also be divided into two main categories, which are technical
countermeasures and non-technical countermeasures.
2.4.1 Technical Countermeasures
Patching the systems against vulnerabilities and implementing the latest technical security
measures are the most prominent technical countermeasures. Security test and audits should be
performed periodically. Active cyber security teams that are working for governments should
gather cyber intelligence. Based on this cyber intelligence, predictions should be made and
preventive actions should be taken. Also, research and development facilities should be
supported by governments. The security for SCADA networks is a new and extremely important
subject. Security must be a design issue for SCADA systems; it should not be an add-on.
Certified software and hardware usage should be prioritized.23 Both technical and policy based
access control mechanisms should be used.24
2.4.2 Non-technical Countermeasures
There are two important non-technical countermeasures, which are awareness and cooperation.
The most effective countermeasure for people vulnerabilities is security awareness. Security
awareness is a vital countermeasure for not only computer users. Everyone whether computer
user or not in an organization should be the target of security awareness programs.
Security is a matter of coordination, cooperation, collaboration and communication. In 2009, a
Department of Homeland Security official said that hackers are better organized than
governments.25
For all the types of threats that are stated in this paper, cooperation is a vital countermeasure. For
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all four threat categories, the possible cooperation instances are shown in Table-3. For a
government, cooperation with critical infrastructure operators and owners is an essential and
imperative countermeasure. Cooperation with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) is a significant countermeasure against hacktivist attacks.
Cooperation with police and law enforcement agencies is essential in order to combat cyber
crime. Cooperation with CERTs and other countries are crucial in order to deal with cyber war.
Cooperation with employees and cutting-edge technology makers is an indispensable
countermeasure against cyber espionage.
THREAT TYPE

COOPERATION WITH ...

Hacktivism

Cooperation with ISPs
Cooperation with CERTs
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners

Cyber Crime

Cooperation with police
Cooperation with law enforcement agencies
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners

Cyber Espionage

Cooperation with employees
Cooperation with technology developers
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners

Cyber War

Cooperation with CERTs, ISPs
International cooperation
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners
Table 3: Threat categories versus sides of cooperation

2.4.3 Countermeasures - Final Remarks

Countermeasures are imperative in order to deal with cyber risks and to ensure an acceptable
level of critical infrastructure protection. The application of all types of countermeasures should
be considered as a life-cycle process. Once a countermeasure is applied, the effectiveness of the
countermeasure should be measured continuously. The application and effectiveness of
countermeasures should be monitored and improved as necessary. In Table-4, prominent
countermeasures are listed for each threat category. Cooperation and technical countermeasures
should be applied for all types of threats. Although security awareness is also applicable in order
to deal with all threat types, it is especially important to counteract cyber espionage.
THREAT TYPE

COUNTERMEASURE

Hacktivism

Cooperation
Technical Countermeasures

Cyber Crime

Cooperation
Technical Countermeasures

Cyber Espionage

Cooperation
Security Awareness
Technical Countermeasures

Cyber War

Cooperation
Technical Countermeasures
Table 4: Threat categories versus countermeasure types

3. Conclusion
Today, cyber systems serve as key infrastructures for critical sectors. Almost all sectors use
information technologies for automating their core business processes. Automated business
processes are connected to the Internet and corporate networks for optimization and decreasing

costs. Cyber systems of critical infrastructures are among the attractive targets of cyber threats.
There are different types of threats with different motivations, qualifications and capacities. All
of these threats exploit certain vulnerabilities of cyber systems of critical infrastructures.
Therefore vulnerabilities have to be mitigated in order to cope with threats. There are different
types of countermeasures in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities. The impact level and diversity
of cyber threats will increase steadily in parallel with the widespread use of cyber systems.
Therefore, critical infrastructure protection will be one of the most important agenda items of all
governments in the near future.
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